We investigate the implications of welfare lower bounds together with queue-e¢ ciency and strategyproofness in the context of the queueing problem. As a consequence, we provide alternative characterizations of the k-pivotal mechanisms (Mitra and Mutuswami [13]). First, we introduce the k-welfare lower bound, which ensures that no agent is worse o¤ than the case where she is assigned to the kth position in the queue without any monetary transfer. For each k; we show that the k-pivotal mechanisms generate the minimal budget de…cit in each queueing problem among all mechanisms satisfying queue-e¢ ciency, strategyproofness and the k-welfare lower bound. Next, we consider a well-known welfare lower bound, the identical preferences lower bound and show that when there are odd number of agents, the k-pivotal mechanisms with k = n+1 2 generate the minimal budget de…cit in each queueing problem among all mechanisms satisfying queue-e¢ ciency, strategyproofness and the identical preferences lower bound.
Introduction
A queueing problem concerns the following situation. A group of agents must be served in a facility (for example, a machine, a supercomputer or an expensive software in a university. See Maniquet [10] , for more examples). The facility can handle only one agent at a time and agents incur waiting costs. We are interested in deciding the order to serve agents and the monetary transfers they should pay for the service. We assume that an agent's waiting cost is constant per unit of time, but that agents di¤er in their waiting costs. Furthermore, we assume that the utility of an agent is the amount of her monetary transfer minus her waiting costs. A mechanism assigns to each agent a position in the queue and a monetary transfer.
Queueing problems have been extensively analyzed both from a normative viewpoint (Chun [2] , [3] ; Maniquet [10] ) as well as from a strategic viewpoint (Mitra [11] ; Mitra and Mutuswami [13] ). Also, several studies have analyzed the problem by combining the two approaches. 1 They are interested in mechanisms satisfying queue-e¢ ciency and strategyproofness together with additional distributional requirements: queue-e¢ ciency requires to minimize the aggregate waiting cost and strategyproofness induces each agent to report her waiting costs truthfully. The classic result of Holmström [8] implies in the context of queueing problems that a mechanism satis…es queue-e¢ ciency and strategyproofness if and only if it is a VCG mechanism. 2 Imposing an additional distributional requirement gives us a subclass of VCG mechanisms.
Chun, Mitra and Mutuswami [4] additionally impose egalitarian equivalence (Pazner and Schmeidler [17] ), which requires that there should be a reference bundle such that each agent enjoys the same utility between her consumption bundle and that reference bundle, and characterize a subfamily of VCG mechanisms. Also, a mechanism satisfying no-envy (Foley [6] ) together with queue-e¢ ciency and strategyproofness is characterized in Kayi and Ramaekers [9] . No-envy requires that no agent should end up with a higher utility by consuming what any other agent consumes. Our normative distributional requirements of welfare lower bounds provide a safety net to each agent. They play an important role in the fairness literature (Thomson [20] ) and have been analyzed for several other economic problems 3 ; however, in the queueing problem, they have not been investigated in depth.
From an agent's point of view, when there is no monetary transfer, the best queue position is obviously the …rst one and the worst is the last one. Consider a situation where all agents have equal rights over the use of the server and no agent is responsible for the existence of other agents. Then, each agent's "stand-alone utility"is the one where she is assigned the …rst queue position and no monetary transfer. A mechanism which guarantees each agent a welfare level at least as much as her stand-alone utility is said to meet the 1-welfare lower bound. Thus, the 1-welfare lower bound protects agents from the negative e¤ects of circumstance for which they are not responsible, namely, the existence of other agents.
Since the total monetary transfer is not restricted in this problem, mechanisms that satisfy queue-e¢ ciency, strategyproofness and the 1-welfare lower bound exist. However, if one requires that the mechanism does not generate a budget de…cit in any queueing problem, then there is no queue-e¢ cient and strategyproof mechanism meeting the 1-welfare lower bound. To obtain compatibility, we weaken the 1-welfare lower bound and introduce a family of welfare lower bounds, the k-welfare lower bound where k 2 f1; 2; :::; ng. A mechanism that meets the kwelfare lower bound ensures each agent to enjoy a utility level at least as much as the one at which she is assigned to the kth position in the queue without any monetary transfer. That is, the k-welfare lower bound guarantees each agent a utility no smaller than her worst utility for the problem with k agents (see Subsection 3.1 for more details). Fortunately, queue-e¢ ciency, strategyproofness, the k-welfare lower bound and no-de…cit are compatible if k n+1 2 . As k increases, the lower bound on the utility decreases together with the minimum possible budget de…cit compatible with the k-welfare lower bound (i.e., the maximum possible budget surplus compatible with the k-welfare lower bound increases). Hence, we face the usual trade-o¤ between the level of fairness and the size of the budget surplus generated.
Our main result is the characterization, for each k 2 f1; 2; :::; ng; of the parameterized family of mechanisms that generate the minimal de…cit in each queueing problem among all queuee¢ cient and strategyproof mechanisms meeting the k-welfare lower bound. As it turns out, it is the family of k-pivotal mechanisms introduced and characterized by Mitra and Mutuswami [13] . For a given integer k 2 f1; 2; :::; ng; a k-pivotal mechanism chooses an e¢ cient queue and assigns the following transfers: An agent whose queue position is r < k pays the sum of the waiting costs of all agents occupying queue positions r + 1 to k. An agent whose queue position is s > k receives the sum of the waiting costs of all agents occupying queue positions k to s 1. The agent at the kth position in the queue pays and receives nothing. For k = n; we have the well-known "pivotal"mechanisms where each agent pays the sum of waiting costs of those served after him. Mitra and Mutuswami [13] characterized the k-pivotal mechanisms with queue-e¢ ciency, equal treatment of equals, pairwise strategyproofness, and weak linearity. They also showed that these mechanisms are weakly group strategyproof. 4 Here, we provide an alternative characterization of the k-pivotal mechanisms without relying on the technical axiom of weak linearity. Thus, our characterization of the k-pivotal mechanisms which uses only normative and strategic axioms provides an appealing justi…cation for these mechanisms.
Next, we investigate one of the oldest fairness notion: guaranteeing each agent her utility from the equal split of the resources. Equal division is not well-de…ned in problems of allocating indivisible goods (such as queue positions). However, in such problems, an adaptation of the "equal-split lower bound," namely, the identical preferences lower bound (Moulin [14] ), can be used. This bound requires that no agent is worse o¤ than her utility at the Pareto-e¢ cient and egalitarian allocation in the hypothetical economy where all agents have the same preferences as hers. Note that in classical fair division problems where equal division is well-de…ned, the equal-split lower-bound coincides with the identical preferences lower bound. Obviously, the identical preferences lower bound and the k-welfare lower bound are based on di¤erent fairness motivations. However, we show that in queueing problems, the two bounds are closely related. In particular, the identical preferences lower bound is equal to the expectation of k bounds. We also show that when there is an odd number of agents, the k-pivotal mechanisms with k = n+1 2 generate the minimal de…cit in each queueing problem among all mechanisms satisfying queuee¢ ciency, strategyproofness and the identical preferences lower bound. Given our characterizations together with the results in Mitra and Mutuswami [13] , the kpivotal mechanisms appear to be a prominent class of mechanisms satisfying several equity and strategic properties in queueing problems.
In what follows, the model and mechanisms are presented in Section 2. The results regarding k-welfare lower bound, the identical preferences lower bound, and budget properties are presented in Section 3. We conclude in Section 4.
The model
Let N = f1; : : : ; ng; n 2; be the set of agents. Each agent has one job to process and the server can process only one job at a time. Each job requires the same processing time, which without loss of generality, we normalize to one. A queue is an onto function : N ! f1; : : : ; ng. 4 Pairwise strategy-proofness requires that there does not exist a deviation for a coalition of size at most two making all deviating agents strictly better-o¤. Weak group strategy-proofness requires that there does not exist a deviation which makes all deviating agents strictly better-o¤. Weak linearity is a technical condition requiring that transfers vary in a linear fashion whenever an agent changes her announcement in a manner which does not change the e¢ cient queue. Equal treatment of equals requires that agents with the same waiting costs should end up with the same utilities. Agent i's position in the queue is denoted by i . The predecessors of i in the queue , denoted by P i ( ), is the set fj 2 N j j < i g. Similarly, the followers of i in the queue , denoted by F i ( ), is the set fj 2 N j j > i g. The set of all possible queues is denoted by (N ).
Each agent is identi…ed with her waiting cost per unit of time, i 2 R + . 5 A queueing problem is the pro…le of waiting costs of all agents = ( i ) i2N . Let Q N be the class of all problems for N . An allocation for 2 Q N is a pair ( ; t); where = ( i ) i2N is the queue and t = (t i ) i2N the vector of monetary transfer to agents. If agent i's queue position is i , then she incurs a waiting cost of ( i 1) i . An agent's net utility depends on her waiting cost and the transfer she receives. We assume that each agent i 2 N has a quasi-linear utility function, so that her utility from consuming the bundle ( i ; t i ) is given by u i ( i ; t i ; i ) = ( i 1) i + t i . For each 2 Q N and each i 2 N , let i = ( j ) j2N nfig be the pro…le of waiting costs of all agents except agent i. For each 2 Q N and each k 2 f1; 2; :::; ng; let [k] be the kth highest waiting cost in the problem . 6 A queue is e¢ cient for the pro…le if it minimizes the aggregate waiting cost of the agents, that is, 2 argmin
The e¢ cient queue is unique if i 6 = j for all i; j 2 N; i 6 = j. It is straightforward to check that a queue is e¢ cient if and only if agents are served in the non-increasing order of their waiting costs. Let E( ) be the set of all e¢ cient queues for the pro…le . A mechanism = ( ; t) associates with each problem 2 Q N ; an allocation ( ) = ( ; t) 2 (N ) R n . In this paper, we …x the set of agents and change the pro…le of waiting costs. To indicate the dependence on the problem ; we denote the allocation as ( ) = ( ( ); t( )). For each i 2 N; i ( ) = ( i ( ); t i ( )) represents agent i's position in the queue and her transfer.
For each 2 Q N ; the total transfer P i2N t i ( ) measures the budget de…cit generated in the problem . If P i2N t i ( ) > 0; then the budget de…cit equals
; then the budget is balanced.
The Mechanisms
We begin with two important properties of mechanisms. First, a mechanism should choose an e¢ cient queue for each queueing problem.
Queue-e¢ ciency: For each 2 Q N ; ( ) 2 E( ).
Remark 1. Our de…nition of a mechanism associates a unique queue to each queueing problem. Since E( ) can contain more than one element, a tie-breaking rule is used to select a unique e¢ cient queue whenever there is more than one such queue. We assume that there is an order of the agents according to which ties are broken. The same order is also used when we have to deal with subsets of the set of agents. Let T be the set of all possible tie-breaking rules for N and be a typical element of T .
Our second property requires that an agent cannot strictly gain by misrepresenting her waiting cost, no matter what waiting costs other agents report. 7 
5 Here, R+ denotes the non-negative orthant of the real line and R++ the positive orthant. 6 All ties are taken into account in this order. For instance, if there are two agents whose waiting costs are the highest for ; then [1] = [2] . 7 See Thomson [20] for an extensive survey on strategyproofness.
1) i + t i (
0 ) be the utility of agent i when the announced pro…le is 0 and her own waiting cost is i .
Strategyproofness: For each
2 Q N ; each i 2 N and each
We need the following notation. For each 2 Q N ; suppose that there is an initial queue ( ) and agent i leaves the queue. The "induced" queue ( i ) (of length n 1) for N n fig is de…ned as follows:
In words, ( i ) is the queue formed by removing agent i and moving all agents behind her up by one position. It is easy to see that ( i ) is e¢ cient for the pro…le i if ( ) is e¢ cient for the pro…le . A VCG mechanism chooses for each queueing problem an e¢ cient queue and then, the transfer of each agent is determined in two parts. First, each agent pays the total waiting cost incurred by all other agents at the e¢ cient queue chosen by the mechanism. Second, each agent receives an amount that only depends on the waiting costs of the other agents. For each i 2 N; let h i be a real-valued function such that for each 2 Q N ; h i depends only on i . Let h = (h i ) i2N and H be the set of all h's.
The VCG mechanism associated with h 2 H and 2 T ; h; : Let h;
( ; t h; ) be such that for each 2 Q N ; ( ) 2 E( ); and each i 2 N;
Without loss of generality, we can write for each 2 Q N and each i 2 N;
where g i is a real-valued function which depends only on i . By substituting (3) in (2), together with (1), for each 2 Q N and each i 2 N;
Hence, for each 2 T ; g; = ( ; t g; ) is a VCG mechanism if for each 2 Q N ; ( ) 2 E( ); and for each i 2 N; the transfer is speci…ed as in (4).
Remark 2. Holmström [8] showed that when preferences are quasi-linear and the domain of types is convex, a mechanism satis…es queue-e¢ ciency and strategyproofness if and only if it is a VCG mechanism. In the queueing problem, since the type of each agent is her waiting cost, and moreover, the domain of waiting costs, R n + ; is convex, Holmström's result can be applied.
We are interested in a subclass of the VCG mechanisms, namely, the class of k-pivotal mechanisms introduced and characterized by Mitra and Mutuswami [13] on the basis of group strategyproofness. Let k 2 f1; 2; :::; ng; 2 T and P k;
( ; t k; ) be such that for each 2 Q N ; ( ) 2 E( ) and for each i 2 N;
For each k 2 f1; 2; :::; ng; a k-pivotal mechanism assigns to each agent the following transfer: An agent whose queue position is i ( ) = r < k pays the sum of the waiting costs of all agents occupying queue positions r + 1 to k. The agent whose queue position is i ( ) = k pays and receives nothing. An agent whose queue position is i ( ) = s > k receives the sum of the waiting costs of all agents occupying queue positions k to s 1.
For our characterizations, we introduce an alternative speci…cation of the transfers for the k-pivotal mechanism.
The k-pivotal mechanism associated with 2 T ; P k; : Let P k; = ( ; t k; ) be such that for each 2 Q N ; ( ) 2 E( ) and for each i 2 N;
For each k 2 f1; 2; :::; ng; let P k = fP k; g 2T be the class of all k-pivotal mechanisms. By (6), for each P k; = ( ; t k; ) 2 P k ; P k; = g; where for each 2 Q N and each i 2 N; if k 2 f1; 2; :::; n 1g; then g i ( i ) = P n 1 l=k ( i ) [l] ; and if k = n; then g i ( i ) = 0. For a k-pivotal mechanism, each agent …rst pays the sum of the waiting costs of her followers and then, she receives the amount P n 1 l=k ( i ) [l] 0. Thus, for each 2 Q N and each i 2 N; t k; i ( ) P j2F i ( ( )) j : Note that P n; = h; where for each 2 Q N and each i 2 N; h i ( i ) = P j2N nfig ( j ( i ) 1) j : From (2), for each 2 Q N ; the transfer of each agent is equal to the externality she exerts. Thus, n-pivotal mechanisms are the well-known "pivotal" mechanisms.
It is easy to see that when k = n; the transfers speci…ed in (6) are identical to the ones speci…ed in (5) . We also show that the transfers speci…ed in (5) and (6) coincide for k = 1; : : : ; n 1. Proposition 1. Let k 2 f1; 2; :::; n 1g and P k; = ( ; t k; ) 2 P k . For each 2 Q N and each i 2 N;
Proof : Let k 2 f1; 2; :::; n 1g; P k; = ( ; t k; ) 2 P k ; and 2 Q N . Note that for each l 2 f1; 2; :::; n 1g and each i 2 N;
Let i 2 N . The proof is divided into 3 cases.
. Since r < k; for each l 2 fk; :::; n 1g; i ( ) < l. By (8) ,
as claimed.
. By (8),
and
By (8),
Altogether,
Results

The k-Welfare Lower Bound
Imagine that there is only one agent in the society. Since she is the only agent, she would occupy the …rst position in the queue and incur no waiting cost. Hence, there is no need to give her a (positive or negative) monetary compensation. Her utility in this one-agent problem is called her stand-alone utility. Since no agent is responsible for the existence of other agents in the queueing problem, it may be fair to guarantee each agent her stand-alone utility. Our next axiom requires that each agent should be guaranteed her stand-alone utility.
Stand-alone lower bound: For each 2 Q N and each i 2 N; u i ( i ( ); i ) 0.
A mechanism = ( ; t) meets the stand-alone lower-bound if for each 2 Q N and each i 2 N; t i ( ) ( i ( ) 1) i ; which implies that P i2N t i ( )
Thus, if a mechanism meets the stand-alone lower bound, then it causes a budget de…cit: the following axiom is violated.
No budget de…cit: For each 2 Q N ;
To satisfy no budget de…cit, we need to weaken the stand-alone lower-bound. For k 2 f1; 2; :::; ng; the k-welfare lower bound requires that no agent be worse o¤ than if she is assigned to the kth position in the queue with a zero transfer. Since the stand-alone lower bound is the same thing as the 1-welfare lower bound, the k-welfare lower bound can be regarded as generalizing the idea of the stand-alone lower bound with k 2 f1; 2; :::; ng. As k increases, the lower bound on the utility decreases. For each k 2 f1; 2; :::; n 1g; if a mechanism satis…es the k-welfare lower bound, then it satis…es the (k + 1)-welfare lower bound. Let k 2 f1; 2; :::; ng.
k-welfare lower bound: For each 2 Q N and each i 2 N; u i ( i ( ); i ) (k 1) i .
A welfare lower bound in the fairness literature is typically determined by considering a particular "reference" allocation in a hypothetical problem and taking the welfare levels at this allocation as a benchmark for the utilities in the actual problem. Thus, an alternative motivation for the k-welfare lower bound can be given as follows. The 1-welfare lower bound guarantees each agent the utility obtained when she is the only agent in the problem. Now suppose that there are 2 agents. Without any transfer, the worst-case for an agent is if she is assigned to the last queue position. Taking this utility in the hypothetical 2-agent problem as the welfare lower bound in the actual problem leads to the 2-welfare lower bound. Similarly, for each k 2 f1; 2; :::; ng; the k-welfare lower bound ensures that no agent is worse o¤ than if she were assigned the worst position and a zero transfer in the hypothetical k-agent problem. We are searching for the mechanisms that generate the minimal budget de…cit in each queueing problem among the class of VCG mechanisms meeting the k-welfare lower bound. In general, there is no reason to expect the existence of a rule that dominates all others with respect to the budget de…cit. As it turns out, for each k; the k-pivotal mechanism achieves our objective. Hence, our next characterization provides an alternative normative justi…cation for these mechanisms. Theorem 1. Let k 2 f1; 2; :::; ng. A mechanism minimizes the budget de…cit in each queueing problem among all mechanisms satisfying queue-e¢ ciency, strategyproofness and the k-welfare lower bound if and only if it is a k-pivotal mechanism.
Proof : Let k 2 f1; 2; :::; ng and P k; = ( ; t k; ) 2 P k . By Remark 2, P k; satis…es queuee¢ ciency and strategyproofness. By (7), for each 2 Q N and each i 2 N;
Let i 2 N .
(i) If i ( ) = r < k; then for each l 2 fr + 1; r + 2; :::; kg; i [l] . By (14) ,
(iii) If i ( ) = s > k; then for each l 2 fk; k + 1; :::; s 1g; i [l] . By (14) ,
Therefore, for each 2 Q N , each i 2 N; and each possible queue position for agent i, u i (P k; i ( ); i ) (k 1) i ; which implies that P k; meets the k-welfare lower bound.
Conversely, let = ( ; t) be a mechanism satisfying queue-e¢ ciency, strategyproofness and the k-welfare lower bound. By Remark 2, is a VCG mechanism, that is, there is a real-valued function g : R n 1 + ! R and 2 T such that = g; = ( ; t g; ) where t g; is speci…ed as in (4) . By the k-welfare lower bound, for each 2 Q N and each i 2 N;
The proof is divided into two cases:
Case 1: k 2 f1; 2; :::; n 1g. Then, for each 2 Q N and each i 2 N;
Proof for Case 1 : Suppose, by contradiction, that there is 2 Q N and i 2 N such that
= ( i ; i ). Then, for each l 2 fk; :::; n 1g; (
Since i = i ; by (17) and (18), (15) . Therefore, (16) holds.
Case 2: k = n. Then, for each 2 Q N and each i 2 N;
Proof for Case 2 : Suppose, by contradiction, that there is 2 Q N and i 2 N such that
Since i = i ; by (20) and (21), (15) . Therefore, (19) holds.
For each 2 Q
to minimize the budget de…cit, we need to minimize P i2N g i ( i ). Therefore, for each 2 Q N and each i 2 N; (16) should hold as an equality for k 2 f1; 2; :::; n 1g and (19) for k = n. Therefore, by (4) and (6), we conclude that g; is a k-pivotal mechanism.
The next result follows from the proof of Theorem 1. Corollary 1. Let k 2 f1; 2; :::; ng: A mechanism satis…es queue-e¢ ciency, strategyproofness and the k-welfare lower bound if and only if it is a VCG mechanism g; = ( ; t g; ) such that for each 2 Q N and each i 2 N;
if k 2 f1; 2; :::; n 1g; and
From Corollary 1, for each k 2 f1; 2; :::; ng; if g; = ( ; t g; ) is a VCG mechanism meeting the k-welfare lower bound, then for each 2 Q N and each i 2 N; t
The Identical Preferences Lower Bound
For agent i 2 N; consider a hypothetical "reference problem" i 2 Q N where all agents have preferences (in the queueing problem, waiting costs) identical to hers, that is, for each j 2 N; i j = i . Since all agents have equal rights and identical preferences, they should enjoy the same utility. The identical preferences lower bound (Moulin [14] ) requires that each agent should be at least as well o¤ as she would be, under queue-e¢ ciency, budget balance and equal treatment of equals, if all other agents had preferences identical to hers. Note that if a mechanism satis…es queue-e¢ ciency, budget balance and equal treatment of equals, then for each i 2 N; in i ; each agent's utility is an equal share of
Identical preferences lower bound: For each 2 Q N and each i 2 N;
Even though the k-welfare lower bound and the identical preferences lower bound are based on entirely di¤erent fairness considerations, they are closely related in the context of queueing problems. Suppose that agents do not know the size of the population. They expect to face one of the hypothetical problems with k 2 f1; 2; : : : ; ng agents. Remember that for each k 2 f1; 2; : : : ; ng; the k-welfare lower bound guarantees each agent at least as much as her worst-case utility in the hypothetical k-agent problem without any transfer. One can take the expectation of these worst-case utilities of an agent over all hypothetical problems with k agents as a welfare lower bound. Call this bound as the "expected k-welfare lower bound."
The expected k-welfare lower bound can also be thought of as a welfare lower bound from random arrival: assume that agents arrive randomly to join a queue, the server starts once all n agents arrive, and no monetary transfer is carried out. Hence, agent i who arrives in the kth position has a utility equal to (k 1) i . To remove the unfairness associated with a particular arrival order, we can take the expectation of the utilities over all arrival orders and each agent would be guaranteed a utility at least as much as 1 n P n k=1 (k 1) i . A mechanism meets the expected k-welfare lower bound if for each 2 Q N and each i 2 N;
Therefore, the expected k-welfare lower bound coincides with the identical preferences lower bound. Moreover, the k-welfare lower bound and the identical preferences lower bound are related in a more direct way. Since 2 ; the k-welfare lower bound implies the identical preferences lower bound, 9 and the k-pivotal mechanisms meets the identical preferences lower bound. On the other hand, if k > n+1 2 ; then for each 2 Q N and each i 2 N such that i ( ) = k; by (14) ,
; implying that the k-pivotal mechanism with k > n+1 2 does not meet the identical preferences lower bound. Hence, we have the following result. In queueing problems, Mitra [12] showed the existence of a VCG mechanism meeting the identical preferences lower bound (together with budget balance). Here, we provide the full characterization of the class of VCG mechanisms meeting the identical preferences lower bound in queueing problems. For each x 2 R ++ , let hxi + denote the smallest integer greater than or equal to x and hxi denote the largest integer smaller than or equal to x: Proposition 3. (a) If a mechanism satis…es queue-e¢ ciency, strategyproofness and the identical preferences lower bound, then it is a VCG mechanism g; = ( ; t g; ) such that for each 2 Q N and each i 2 N;
(b) If a VCG mechanism g; = ( ; t g; ) is such that for each 2 Q N and each i 2 N;
then it meets the identical preferences lower bound.
We omit the proof of Proposition 3, which is in line with the proof of Theorem 1. 10 Since the symmetrically balanced VCG mechanisms (Suijs [19] ; Mitra [12] ; Kayi and Raemaekers [9] 11 ) satisfy the three axioms of Proposition 3(a), they also satisfy (22) .
If n is an odd number, then
Hence, for problems with odd number of agents, the following characterization follows from Theorem 1 and Proposition 3.
Corollary 2. Let n be an odd number.
(a) A mechanism satis…es queue-e¢ ciency, strategyproofness and the identical preferences lower bound if and only if it is a VCG mechanism g; = ( ; t g; ) such that for each 2 Q N and each i 2 N;
(b) A mechanism minimizes the budget de…cit in each queueing problem among all mechanisms satisfying queue-e¢ ciency, strategyproofness and the identical preferences lower bound if and only if it is a k-pivotal mechanism with k = n+1 2 .
Budget Properties
It is well-known that the VCG mechanisms in general do not balance the budget. However, in queueing problems, the symmetrically balanced VCG mechanisms satisfy budget balance. On the other hand, the k-pivotal mechanisms do not satisfy budget balance except for the special case in which n = 3 and k = n+1 2 (see equality (26) and also Mitra and Mutuswami [13] ). When n = 3, the 2-pivotal mechanisms coincide with the symmetrically balanced VCG mechanisms. The next result follows from Proposition 4 in Mitra [12] . Proposition 4. Let n = 3. A mechanism minimizes the budget de…cit in each queueing problem among all VCG mechanisms meeting the 2-welfare lower bound if and only if it is a VCG mechanism that satis…es the identical preferences lower bound and budget balance. Now we ask whether there are VCG mechanisms satisfying the k-welfare lower bound and no budget de…cit. For k = 1; the answer is negative. When there are more than 3 agents, the negative result remains even if the 1-welfare lower bound is weakened to the 2-welfare lower bound. This negative result is generalized as follows.
2 ; then no VCG mechanism satis…es the k-welfare lower bound and no budget de…cit.
Proof : Let k 2 f1; 2; :::; ng, P k;
( ; t k; ) 2 P k ; and g; = ( ; t g; ) be a VCG mechanism satisfying the k-welfare lower bound. By Corollary 1, for each 2 Q N and each i 2 N; t
Note that for each 2 Q N ;
; and
! for k = 1; : : : ; n 1;
where the second equality follows from (8) . By (6) and (25), the budget de…cit generated by P k; is
If k = 1; by (26a), for each 2 R n ++ ;
i ( ) > 0 and by (24) ,
2 ; let 2 Q N be such that for each i 2 N; i = 0 > 0. By (24) and (26b),
2 ; both P k; and g; violate no budget de…cit.
Let P k; 2 P k . By (26) , if k = 1; then P k; generates a non-negative budget de…cit at all pro…les and if 2 k < n+1 2 ; then P k; does not necessarily generate a budget de…cit:
i ( ) may be positive, negative, or zero depending on . For instance,
On the other hand, by Proposition 5.10 in Mitra and Mutuswami [13] , if k n+1 2 ; then P k; generates a budget surplus for all pro…les (i.e., P k; satis…es no budget de…cit). Hence, by Proposition 5, we have the following result. We further weaken the requirement of no budget de…cit by setting an upper bound on the budget de…cit (or budget surplus). If the upper bound is equal to 0, then it is the requirement of no budget de…cit. Let T 2 R + be given. Can we …nd VCG mechanisms meeting the k-welfare lower bound and generate a budget de…cit or a budget surplus which never exceeds the given constant T ? If this bound is satis…ed, then the center knows that the largest amount of budget de…cit or budget surplus it may face in any queueing problem, no matter what the waiting costs of the agents are, is the …xed amount T .
T-bounded budget de…cit: For each 2 Q N ; P i2N t i ( ) T .
T-bounded budget surplus: For each 2 Q N ; P
Note that T -bounded budget de…cit implies that the budget surplus is bounded below by T and T -bounded budget surplus implies that the budget de…cit is bounded below by T On the domain of pro…les R n + ; there is no upper bound on waiting costs. Hence, by (26), for 2 k < n+1 2 ; positive budget de…cits or surpluses generated by mechanisms in P k can be arbitrarily large. Therefore, for 2 k < n+1 2 ; the k-pivotal mechanisms satisfy neither T -bounded budget de…cit nor T -bounded budget surplus.
On the other hand, by (26) , for k = 1; the budget de…cit
where 0 is such that for each i 2 N; 0 i = 0 (i.e., the maximal budget surplus is 0). Thus, 1-pivotal mechanisms satisfy T -bounded budget surplus (with T = 0) but not T -bounded budget de…cit. Similarly, for k
i ( 0 ) = 0; which implies that for k n+1 2 ; the k-pivotal mechanisms satisfy T -bounded budget de…cit (with T = 0) but not T -bounded budget surplus.
Next we ask whether we can pin down the bounds on budget de…cits and surpluses if we restrict ourselves to the class of problems in which the waiting costs are bounded above. For each a 2 R + ; let Q N (a) = f 2 R n + : 8i 2 N; 0 i ag. Note that all our previous results hold on Q N (a) for each a 2 R + . Moreover, we show that for any k 2 f1; 2; :::; ng, the k-pivotal mechanisms satisfy T -bounded budget de…cit as well as T -bounded budget surplus on this domain.
2 ; then for each P k; 2 P k ; each a 2 R + and each 2 Q N (a);
Proof : Let k 2 f1; 2; :::; ng, P k; 2 P k and a 2 R + . Given 2 Q N (a); let k 2 Q N (a) be such that for each i 2 N;
. Let 2 Q N (a) be such that for each i 2 N; i = a. Note that for each l 2 f1; 2; :::; kg; [l] [k] and for each l 2 fk; k + 1; :::; ng; [l] [k] : By (26), for each 2 Q N (a);
a and
Note that (26) can also be written as, for each 2 Q N (a);
(a) Suppose that k < n+1 2 . Since (n 2k + 1) > 0; by (29), for each 2 Q N (a);
i ( ); which implies that max 2Q N (a) [l] = a. By (30), for k 2 f1; 2g;
a. Since (n 2k + 1) > 0; by (30), for each 2 Q N (a);
Altogether, for each 2 Q N (a); (27) holds: i ( )
Let 00 2 Q N (a) be such that for each l 2 f2; 3; :::; kg;
00
[l] = a and if k < n; then for each l 2 fk + 1; :::; ng;
[l] = 0. By (26b),
a.
Since (n 2k + 1) 0; by (30), for each 2 Q N (a);
Altogether, for each 2 Q N (a); (28) holds:
Note that by (24) , (27), and (28), on Q N (a); for each k 2 f1; 2; :::; ng; if a VCG mechanism g; = ( ; t g; ) meets the k-welfare lower bound, then it satis…es T -bounded budget surplus:
for each 2 Q N (a); the budget surplus P i2N t g; i ( ) is bounded above by 2 . Finally, we point out the trade o¤ between the level of welfare and the budget surplus generated by the k-pivotal mechanisms. As k increases, for each k 2 f1; 2; :::; n 1g and 2 Q N ; the budget de…cit and the total welfare decreases by X 
Concluding Remarks
The k-welfare lower bound should not be confused with k-fairness introduced by Porter et al. [22] and characterized by Atlamaz and Yengin [1] . These authors considered the problem of assigning a single task among n agents where monetary transfers are possible. They de…ned the …rst best allocation as the Pareto-e¢ cient (the task is assigned to an agent with the lowest cost and the budget is balanced) and egalitarian one. For each k 2 f1; 2; :::; ng; the kth best allocation is the budget balanced and egalitarian allocation at which the task is assigned to an agent with the kth lowest cost. For each k 2 f1; 2; :::; ng; k-fairness requires in each problem the utility at the kth best allocation to be a welfare lower bound. One way to apply k-fairness to queueing problems may be the following: De…ne the …rst best allocation for 2 Q N as the one where the queue is e¢ cient, budget is balanced, and agents have equal utilities. Then, list all possible queues for in the non-decreasing order of aggregate waiting costs. De…ne the kth best allocation for as the one where the kth queue [k] ( ) in this list of all possible queues is selected and utilities are equalized through budget balancing transfers. Note that [1] ( ) 2 E( ). For each k 2 f1; 2; :::; ng; k-fairness de…ned in this way requires that for each 2 R n + and each i 2 N;
Clearly the k-welfare lower bound, k-fairness, and the identical preferences lower bound are conceptually di¤erent requirements with di¤erent underlying philosophical justi…cations. Note that the 1-welfare lower bound implies both k-fairness and the identical preferences lower bound. However, further logical relations may exist between these welfare bounds under queue-e¢ ciency and strategyproofness. We have investigated the relationship between the k-welfare lower bound and the identical preferences lower bound in Section 3.2. In queueing problems, obviously, the 1-welfare lower bound and 1-fairness would coincide in the trivial scenario of n = 1. Investigating further relations between the k-welfare lower bound and k-fairness and between the identical preferences lower bound and k-fairness is an open question. Note that in the class of problems of allocating a single object (or multiple objects when valuation functions are additive) and money, under e¢ ciency of assignment of objects and strategyproofness, the identical preferences lower bound, 1-fairness, and 2-fairness are equivalent (Remark 1 in Yengin [22] , [23] ).
(b) Let g; = ( ; t g; ) be a VCG mechanism such that for each 2 Q N and each i 2 N; (23) holds. Then, by Corollary 1, g; satis…es the k-welfare lower bound where k = 
